Most mainstream accounts of Hamas present it as a bunch of rabid fanatics, bent on violence and motivated by an irrational hatred of Jews and the state of Israel.

When we separate propaganda from reality, however, we find a group that has taken on the mantle of national resistance against Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.

Hamas describes itself as "a Palestinian national liberation movement that struggles for the liberation of the Palestinian occupied territories and for the recognition of the legitimate rights of Palestinians."

In its manifesto in the lead-up to the 2006 elections, it stated: "Our Palestinian people are still living through the phase of national liberation; they have the right to endeavour to regain their rights and end the occupation using all available means, including armed resistance."

It is because of this commitment to the national liberation struggle - and the recognition among Palestinians that Hamas, whatever else it may stand for, refuses to concede on the question of resisting Israeli repression - that the organisation has won wide support.

Hamas began to gain a hearing in the late 1980s, when the secular nationalist Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), dominated by Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction, gave up on the goal of liberating all of historic Palestine and followed a path of negotiations that resulted in the Oslo Accords of 1993.

The culmination of Hamas's growing support was the January 2006 elections to the Palestine Legislative Assembly, in which Hamas won a majority.

The reason for this victory lies not only in the failure of Oslo and the continued brutality of the Israeli occupation, but also mass disillusionment with the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. Hamas's steadfast opposition to occupation and constant criticisms of Fatah's compromises, combined with its network of social service and charity agencies, bolstered its image not only among religious Muslims, but also among secularists and Christians.

Despite its victory in free and fair elections, the US and Israel sought to undermine and destroy Hamas. Israel suspended the transfer of tax revenues collected from Palestinians - $US50 million a month. This began the strangulation of Gaza and set off a humanitarian crisis.

While the public strategy involved the collective punishment of the people of Gaza for electing Hamas, Israel and its US ally also undertook a secret operation to overthrow Hamas, funnelling arms and money to Fatah fighters to enable them to carry out a coup. Hamas won the battle for Gaza, and Fatah was routed. Yet mainstream accounts of the conflict present Hamas as having launched the coup.

The siege and invasion of Gaza have not accomplished Israel's aim of fomenting a Palestinian opposition ready to topple Hamas. On the contrary, Hamas has continued to gain influence. If elections were to be held in occupied Palestine, Hamas would likely win again. Not because all Palestinians agree with Hamas's Islamist principles, but because people living under inhuman conditions imposed by an occupying power will turn to organisations that give voice to their aspirations for liberation.

Hamas was founded in 1987 in the context of the first Palestinian uprising, or Intifada. Organisationally, it comes out of the Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1945 in Jerusalem.

The Brotherhood was a social welfare organisation involved in cultural and social activities. It consciously stayed away from the arena of politics, operating on the premise that its primary goal was to Islamise society.

In 1948, when Israel took over and occupied 78 per cent of historic Palestine, the movement was fractured and split between the West Bank and Gaza. In the West Bank, which came under Jordanian control, it flourished and became a loyal opposition to Jordan's regime. However, in Gaza, under Egyptian administration, it was persecuted and had to go underground.

In 1967, when Israel annexed the West Bank and Gaza, the two Brotherhoods were brought together, fusing the clandestine and more militant tactics of the Gaza wing with the moderate tactics of the Jordanian one.

Israel had started to view the Brotherhood as an ally against the PLO. This dovetailed with the US strategy of supporting and funding Islamist groups as a bulwark against secular nationalist parties.

In 1973, the Islamic Centre (al-Mujamma al-islami) was founded in the Gaza Strip. The Mujamma set up schools, medical clinics, day care centres, youth and sports clubs, and other social and communal forums tied to the mosque. The combination of mosques and social welfare organs would prove crucial for propagating the movement's message and for recruiting cadres.

Nevertheless, the Islamists remained marginal players on the political scene. Until the late 1980s, Fatah and the PLO dominated Palestinian politics, with other more left-wing nationalist organisations vying for influence.

Once again seeking to counter the secular nationalists, the Israeli government formally licensed the Mujamma in 1978. The Islamists' hostility to the left made them useful allies. At times, Israel even funded these forces.

The Mujamma routinely clashed with secular nationalists and far left forces. In 1980, it set fire to the Palestinian Red Crescent office, a stronghold of the left. After 1983, it engaged in violent clashes with PLO members for control over the Islamic University of Gaza. The most bitter and violent confrontations were with more far left groups, like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

In 1987, the Intifada erupted first in the Gaza Strip and then in the West Bank. Up to this point, the Brotherhood had refrained from direct political activity. But it now ran the risk of losing credibility if it did not take part in the uprising. Hamas was set up to participate in the Intifada: it was the product of the pressure exerted by the more nationalist and confrontationist section on the leadership of the Brotherhood.

Around this time, the PLO began to gravitate towards a more compromised stance. It relinquished the long-term goal of liberating all of historic Palestine, recognised the right of Israel to exist and opted for negotiations over armed struggle to form a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Many Palestinians hoped that the Oslo peace process might address the horrific conditions under which they lived. Yet by 2000, the sham of Oslo was exposed, leading to the second Intifada.

Hamas was able to grow and gain influence because it rejected Oslo and held on to a vision of liberating all of historic Palestine. In short, the weakness and wrong turns of secular nationalism and the left created the opening for Hamas to grow.

Hamas today is a different organisation from the one that was founded in 1987. For instance, its 1988 charter makes little effort to distinguish between an anti-Zionist and an anti-Jewish stance. Yet the experience of fighting against the occupation and for national liberation transformed the organisation - in 1990, it published a document stating that its struggle was against Zionists and Zionism, and not Jews and Judaism.

Khaled Hroub, author of Hamas: A Beginner's Guide, wrote in 2000: "The notion of liberating Palestine has assumed greater importance than the general Islamic aspect." This does not mean that Hamas has ceased to be an Islamist party. Its day-to-day activities still involve a strong religious dimension.

Hamas's position on women is reactionary; it sees them as primarily responsible for the home and family life. While it has repeatedly insisted that it will not force women to wear the hijab, there is an indirect pressure exerted on women to follow Hamas's views on veiling, if they wish to seek their help.

Women can join Hamas, but their activity is limited to charities and schools. They are largely invisible, and not one woman has occupied a leadership position in the organisation since 1987.

Nevertheless, Hamas is not as reactionary as the Taliban. It doesn't prohibit women from operating outside the family sphere. Thirteen of the 66 Hamas candidates who ran for election in 2006 were women. Yet despite seven winning their seats, only one woman was included in the cabinet - and, predictably, she was put in charge of women's affairs.

Hamas also differs from more fundamentalist Islamist parties in that it accepts the concept of the nation state. Its party structures are modelled on Western ones, and its internal affairs are carried out in a more or less democratic manner. The leadership inside Palestine is elected from within, by the rank and file. It is also not anti-science or anti-technology.

Hamas exhibits all the contradictions of modern Islamist parties. It achieved prominence because of a political vacuum caused by the collapse of secular nationalism and the left. Yet given its politics and class basis, it doesn't present a long-term solution to the problems faced by the people who turn to it.

The class basis of Islamism is the middle class, which does not have the social weight to bring the system to a standstill or force concessions from powerful groups.

This problem is further compounded in the case of Hamas by the context of occupation. Hamas draws support from merchants, business people and the rich, but its cadre and leadership are drawn largely from the educated middle classes or declassed people in refugee camps.

This explains why Hamas vacillates between armed struggle and radical pronouncements on the one hand, and ceasefires and concessions on the other. Ultimately, these strategies are a dead end.

Palestinian liberation will depend on support from outside the Occupied Territories - most obviously, from the region's working classes, where massive sympathy and solidarity exists with the Palestinian cause.

A strategy that offers hope for Palestinian liberation would connect workers' struggles throughout the region to the fight for one secular, democratic state in Palestine. And that would lay the basis for a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Abridged from an article in Socialist Worker (US) - www.iso.org.